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I. INTRODUCTION
In most developed countries, an increase in the retirement-aged population has
put considerable financial pressure on public pension systems. In response, a
number of countries have reformed their systems and have encouraged a
substitution toward private pensions and tax-sheltered saving. As the baby-boom
cohort reaches retirement age, it is likely that further policy change will be
required; however, knowledge about the behaviour of people as they approach
and reach retirement age and how they might react to policy change is vital for
the formulation of good policy. In the UK, for example, the fiscal treatment of
pensions has changed, leading to changes in the way people save for retirement.
We would like to know if this has altered retirement behaviour and changed
economic resources following retirement. We would like to learn how further
policy changes may affect future behaviour. It is fortunate that we have available
a new dataset — the Retirement Survey — that can be used to answer these
kinds of questions. The three papers in this symposium analyse some of the data
from this survey.
The Retirement Survey is the first major survey in the UK to follow
individuals over time and report on their labour force activity, on their income
and assets and on a broad range of personal characteristics. Previous studies have
provided a cross-section (where we only observe individuals at one point in
time) but have not included a panel element (where we follow the same
individual over several time periods).
Although cross-section data are well-suited for characterising a population,
they may not be particularly useful in understanding behaviour. Retirement is a
good example. To understand the economic determinants of retirement, we need
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to observe the economic environment of a worker at approximately the time he
or she is making a decision about retirement. However, in cross-section, we
would have to rely on retrospection: for example, to find out about retirement at
age 62, we would have to ask 63-year-olds, some of whom retired in the previous
year and some of whom did not, what their wage rates had been, what their
assets were and what the characteristics of their pensions were. We would need
to know similar details about their health status and family situation. Estimations
would then be based on comparing their behaviour as a function of their
economic circumstances. This kind of recollection is bound to cause
considerable observation error in the explanatory variables.
To find rates of retirement at each single year of age, one might extend such
calculations to all ages: that is, query subjects of age t+1 about their economic
environment at age t and their retirement choices between t and t+1. The
resulting retirement rates by single years of age would represent workers from
different cohorts, and, as such, one could not separate out any cohort effects or
drift in that part of retirement not explained by observed variables. That is, we
could not separate out the differences in behaviour of people of a certain age
from those born in a certain year. This defect could partly be overcome by asking
63-year-olds about their circumstances when they were, say, 55 and relating their
retirement behaviour between ages 55 and 56 to the economic environment as
reconstructed from memory. On the face of it, this seems like an impossible task:
for example, it is difficult to measure assets accurately in the present but it is not
likely to be even feasible in retrospect.
In panel data, we can observe processes as they happen. We can ask a subject
about his or her job, the wage rate, health status and other details of the
economic environment and then observe work choices. The economic variables
can be thought of as risk factors, and the retirement hazards are rates of
transition in response to these factors.
Wealth holdings are important indicators of economic status and they help
policymakers understand about the current economic status of a cohort. But to
understand future economic status, we need to understand about the behaviour
that will determine the future trajectory of wealth holdings. The life-cycle model
is the leading theoretical explanation of the determinants of consumption choice
and therefore of wealth change, and we would like to test the predictions of the
life-cycle model to establish its empirical relevance and to quantify its effects so
that we can make quantitative predictions about rates of wealth change.
In principle, one might relate observed wealth holdings in cross-section to the
determinants of saving behaviour over the lifetime of each cohort: the level of
wealth, being the result of saving behaviour, should be governed by the life-cycle
model in the same way as the change in wealth. However, it is very difficult in
cross-section to learn about life-cycle models from wealth holdings because one
cannot adequately control for lifetime resources and variations in rates of return.
An alternative is to study the age profiles of wealth with the hope of learningAssets, Incomes and Retirement
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about changes in wealth as individuals age. However, each cohort has had
different lifetime resources, which usually vary in a systematic way from cohort
to cohort and which, therefore, vary by age in cross-section. Furthermore, the
life-cycle model makes particularly strong predictions about saving behaviour
among individuals who face substantial mortality risk. But, as has been found in
many datasets, mortality risk is higher among those of lower economic status
whether measured as wealth, income, education or type of employment.
1
Therefore, as a cohort ages, average wealth of the survivors could rise even if
each surviving cohort member dissaves. The implication is that, if we want to
study wealth change, we need data on wealth change of households and
individuals: cross-sectional wealth variation by age will not provide the
information we need.
In 1969, the Social Security Administration of the US fielded the Retirement
History Survey (RHS), a biennial panel survey of the cohorts of 1906–11.
Subjects were queried about a wide range of indicators and determinants of
economic behaviour including details of employment, assets, health and so forth.
At baseline, subjects were about ages 58–63 and they were interviewed six
times, the last time in 1979 when they were 68–73. The availability and richness
of this dataset played a very substantial role in establishing the field of the
economics of ageing in the US. The data are the source of a good deal of what
we know about retirement and the events of the first years after retirement. In
particular, the RHS has been the most reliable source of information about
wealth change. Further, the design of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
biennial panel of 51- to 61-year-olds which was begun in 1992, depended heavily
on the knowledge gained from the RHS. The HRS will undoubtedly be the most
important data for the study of retirement behaviour in the US over the next
several decades, and some of the credit for its importance is due to the RHS.
Empirical research in Europe has been hampered by a lack of comparable
panel data. Because good empirical research is informed by knowledge of the
institutions of a particular country and the tastes of the population of that
country, both of which help determine behaviour, empirical researchers have a
comparative advantage when they use data from their own country. Therefore
European empirical researchers have been disadvantaged relative to researchers
from the US. A second consequence is that policymakers in Europe have not
been able to rely on well-founded quantitative information about behaviour and
the likely reaction of a population to policy changes.
For these reasons, the two waves of the Retirement Survey (RS) are likely to
provide an important national resource. If the RHS is a useful model, the RS will
lead to a large expansion in research on the economics of ageing. Because of the
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changing age composition of Great Britain, this area of research is vitally
important for policymakers.
This Fiscal Studies symposium highlights some results from using the RS. It
will take many years before research will show the full range and depth of
questions that the RS can address, but judging from the RHS, it is likely that
hundreds of research papers will be based on it.
II. SAMPLE DESIGN
2
The Retirement Survey is based on a sample design in which a questionnaire was
sent to about 15,000 residential addresses.
3 The questionnaire asked about the
ages of persons living at the address with the objective of locating persons aged
55–69 on 1 December 1988. Thus the survey is approximately representative of
the cohorts of 1919–33. Seventy-five per cent of the questionnaires were
returned; 11 per cent were estimated to have been sent to ineligible addresses.
One in four of the non-responding addresses was then followed up and 91 per
cent of these responded. Thus the response rate at this stage was about 88 per
cent.
The number of households identified as containing at least one eligible
person was 2,917, and interviews were sought from all sample addresses
containing someone of the target age. Interviews were achieved in 88 per cent
(2,565) of these, which covered 3,543 people in the eligible age range. In
addition, 609 partners outside the eligible age range were interviewed. Non-
response was not greatly different by age, gender or marital status.
There was a single interview with respondents and their spouses carried out
between November 1988 and January 1989 using four structured questionnaires.
Questionnaires covered the current financial situation, changes expected or
experienced around the time of retirement, detail on pensions and job history,
and information on actual or expected age at retirement.
After completion of Wave 1, households were contacted annually to maintain
contact for the second wave. In Wave 2, carried out in 1994, attempts were made
to contact all who appeared in Wave 1. The achieved interview rate was 63.4 per
cent, with a recorded death rate of 10.8 per cent and a non-response rate of 25.8
per cent. Non-response was somewhat greater among lower social classes,
among those with lower incomes and among those with higher levels of
disability. The final sample contained 2,247 individuals.
The second wave was a single face-to-face survey covering similar material
to the original survey. It asked for detailed information on current income and
health. Work and pension histories were updated from Wave 1.
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III. RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR IN THE RS
A leading objective of studies of retirement behaviour is to explain the large
decline in the labour force participation rates of older men that are seen in Figure
1 of the paper by Sarah Tanner. In the US, the decline began in the late 1960s at
approximately the time that social security benefits began to increase sharply.
4
By the mid-1980s, social security benefits had stabilised, and the participation
rate of men had approximately stabilised. These facts suggest that, in the US, the
generosity and structure of the social security system was at least partially
responsible for the change in participation of men. This stabilisation does not
seem to have happened in the UK. For example, in Figure 4 of Tanner,
survivorship in the labour force (not retired) is higher in older cohorts than in
younger cohorts. Understanding what caused the difference is an objective of
cross-country comparisons of economic behaviour.
In the US, retirement is concentrated at a few ages, so-called retirement
spikes. The ages are 62 — the age at which early, reduced social security
retirement benefits can first be taken — and 65 — the age at which full social
security benefits can be taken.
5 As shown in Figures 3 and 4 of Tanner,
retirement in the UK is substantially concentrated at age 65 with a smaller spike
at age 60. The explanation for the spike at 65 is clear and similar to the
explanation for the spikes in the retirement rate in the US: 65 is the age at which
men become eligible for the state pension in the UK. The spike at 60 is not as
easy to explain. However, Figure 6 of Tanner suggests rather strongly that the
details of the eligibility for an occupational pension are responsible for part of
the spike. Retirement at age 60 is associated with ‘usual’ retirement age and a
full rather than a reduced pension. The graph implies that the detailed structure
of an occupational pension influences retirement. This finding is similar to
results based on data from the US. For example, workers will delay retirement
until they are eligible for a pension benefit and then retire at a high rate once
they have become eligible: among workers aged 55–58 in 1992, the two-year
retirement hazard rate was 13 per cent among those lacking a private pension, 9
per cent among those with a pension but not yet eligible for benefits, and 26 per
cent among those with a pension and eligible for benefits (Hurd, 1996). Thus the
overall effect of pensions on labour force participation is to increase
participation of workers in their early to late 50s (before pension eligibility) and
to reduce participation by workers in their early 60s (after pension eligibility).
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The effects of occupational pensions on retirement interact with age through
eligibility for the state pension. This is shown in Table 6 of Tanner. Among
those aged 55–59 in Wave 1 who were eligible for an occupational pension, 30
per cent retired by Wave 2 compared with 18 per cent of those of the same age
lacking an occupational pension. As we have seen, some of that retirement is
associated with eligibility for full pension benefits at age 60. Among those aged
60–64 at Wave 1, the retirement rates are almost the same — about 70 per cent
— regardless of eligibility for an occupational pension. The likely explanation is
that both groups become eligible for the state pension at age 65, so that a large
fraction of both groups retire, independently of an occupational pension. This
interaction of age and pension eligibility is similar to what is found in US data.
For example, among workers aged 60–61 (who will over the next two years
become eligible for social security benefits), the two-year retirement hazard was
just 3 percentage points higher among those eligible for private pension benefits
than among those lacking a private pension.
From the comparison of the retirement behaviour of workers with
occupational pensions and those without them, Tanner concludes that the
continuing trend toward earlier retirement may be partly explained by a
continuing growth in the coverage and levels of occupational pensions. There
still remains the question about the retirement behaviour of workers who do not
qualify for an occupational pension. Their participation rate has continued to
fall, and they exhibit a retirement spike at age 60. One possible explanation
would involve unemployment: the most striking difference in the circumstances
and behaviour of the two groups is associated with the state of being
unemployed (Table 6 of Tanner). At Wave 1, about 20 per cent of those lacking
an occupational pension were unemployed, and, between the waves, 57 per cent
moved into the state ‘other’, which is states of not working but not retired (self-
assessed). However, it will have to be an objective of future research to find how
such circumstances and behaviour could lead to the trends that are observed in
the data.
IV. TRAJECTORIES OF INCOME AND WEALTH
The study of the trajectories of income and assets at pre-retirement ages
emphasises income and especially earnings. Topics include wage growth over
the lifetime, labour force participation and hours of work, and unemployment.
Among a relatively small fraction of the population, transitions onto and off
social support programmes are important. Levels and changes in asset income
are relatively unimportant compared with earnings, although, of course, the
trajectory of assets is of considerable interest because it is an indicator of saving
behaviour.
At retirement, the composition of income changes. Earnings fall, possibly to
zero, and they are partly replaced with pension income from both public andAssets, Incomes and Retirement
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private sources. In a life-cycle model, a decline in income at retirement is not
necessarily an indication of economic distress: the mix of resources available to
finance consumption during the retirement years can vary between those that are
measured by their income flows such as pensions and those that are measured by
their stocks such as housing. For example, two individuals may be equally well
prepared financially for retirement; yet one could have very low income as a
result of having substantial financial assets and housing, whereas the other could
have high income as a result of having annuity income. To assess economic
status, it is necessary to study income and assets jointly.
Housing should be considered separately from other assets: it provides a flow
of consumption services; it is a store of value that can be converted to other
types of consumption; transition costs are substantial; individuals have
sentimental attachment to a particular house; and the rate of return on housing
can be quite different from the rate of return on other types of assets. Although
the life-cycle model predicts that, as people age, they will reduce housing
consumption and want to decumulate housing as an asset, the particular features
of housing will complicate the situation. In US data, housing transitions are
associated with retirement as people are no longer geographically constrained by
their employment. There also seems to be a re-optimisation with respect to size
and quality of housing in anticipation of a number of years of residential
stability. Another housing transition is observed at widowhood because of
changes in space requirements, changes in economic circumstances and changes
in the necessity of social support from the family. A similar transition is found in
the RS: the paper by Richard Disney, Paul Johnson and Gary Stears reports that
a transition to widowhood is associated with a 10 per cent decline in nominal
housing wealth. Overall, however, there has not been any clear evidence about
whether housing is decumulated as called for by the life-cycle model because we
have not had data with sufficient age density to study housing transitions at ages
substantially past retirement.
Some of the changes in income and assets following retirement are
behavioural and some are due to changes in the environment. The behavioural
aspects of annuity income include the choice of whether to take a claim to a
private pension as cash or as an annuity, and whether to choose an annuity that
has survivorship benefits. Of course, not all workers are offered such choices: in
particular, public pension systems do not offer those choices, and many private
pensions do not offer them. In the US, most private pension programmes offer a
choice of survivorship benefits, and that choice will result in lower benefits
while the main beneficiary is alive but higher benefits after widowing.
Inflation can change the real value of a pension stream. The two main issues
are whether annuities are indexed and whether the index adequately reflects the
inflation rate felt by the elderly. In the US, social security is indexed to the
consumer price index (CPI), not to a separate price index constructed to reflect
the experience of the elderly. However, Laspeyres price indices constructed toFiscal Studies
148
reflect the particular bundle purchased by the elderly have shown few
differences from the CPI in rates of inflation. Of greater importance is whether
private pensions are indexed. During the high inflation years of the 1970s and
1980s, some private pensions were adjusted on an ad hoc basis, but most are not
formally indexed. For this reason, newly retiring workers in the US should
anticipate a gradual decline in the real value of a private annuity.
In the RS, real pension income was roughly constant on average between the
waves, but there was a differential change associated with the type of
employment (Table 9 in the paper by Paul Johnson, Gary Stears and Steven
Webb): about 40 per cent of semi-skilled or unskilled workers had a decline in
pension income between the waves compared with 27 per cent of professional
workers.
6 Table 10 of Johnson et al. shows more directly a differential by level
of initial pension: those in the lowest interval were considerably more likely to
have had a decline in real pension income. Should these differences persist over
a number of years, there would be a considerable widening of pension income
inequality.
Both the social security system in the US and the state pension system in the
UK have survivorship benefits. An important issue is the level of survivorship
benefits compared with the level of benefits of the couple. This is important
from the point of view of behaviour because a couple should base its
consumption level partly on the annuity a surviving spouse will receive. It is
important from the point of view of assessing economic status in the design of
public programmes: it would not be desirable to make survivorship benefits
either too low because of high rates of poverty in widowhood or too high
because of high rates of poverty preceding widowhood.
In the US, social security benefits typically fall by one-third at the death of a
spouse. The poverty scale that is used to calculate the poverty rate and to
compare economic status across households of differing sizes specifies that an
elderly couple needs 26 per cent more income than a single person to maintain
the same standard of living. This assumes very substantial returns to scale in
consumption: if income fell by 21 per cent at widowing, the widow would be
deemed to be as well off as the couple had been. The implication is that a couple
whose only income was social security could be above the poverty line but the
surviving spouse would be below the poverty line. As an empirical matter, this is
important because a considerable fraction of couples have incomes only
marginally above the poverty level so that the poverty rate increases at the death
of a spouse.
In the UK, it is implicitly assumed in social programmes that a couple needs
67 per cent more income than a single person, implying much lower returns to
scale than are assumed in the US. Because income from social programmes is
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adjusted at the same rate on the death of a spouse as the change in ‘needs’, a
couple whose only income was a public pension would have no change in the
standard of living were one spouse to die. Apparently, a substantial fraction of
couples that were widowed between the waves were approximately in this
position: in Table 2 of Disney et al., just 72 per cent of new widows had any
financial assets at baseline and the median holdings among those with financial
assets was just £4,600.
A couple with an additional source of income that did not change at the death
of one spouse would have an increase in the standard of living at widowing.
Overall incomes of new widows fell by 30 per cent (Table 5 of Johnson et al.).
Had they fallen by 40 per cent, the widow would have been deemed to be as well
off as the couple had been. The implication is that widowhood was accompanied
by an increase in the standard of living. This is, of course, a consequence of the
assumption about the degree of returns to scale. For example, if returns to scale
in consumption were closer to the US standard, widowhood would have been
associated with a decline in standard of living.
According to the life-cycle model, elderly individuals and couples should
dissave at old age, but the age at which that happens will depend on utility
function parameters and the interest rate. A good guess is that we should observe
dissaving when an individual is in his or her early 70s, and possibly earlier.
Among couples, the ages of both spouses are relevant so it is harder to make
predictions. In US panel data from the 1960s, 1970s and mid-1980s, we do see
asset decumulation. These results can be interpreted as supporting the life-cycle
model, but the interpretation requires the assumption that the changes are due to
behaviour — in particular, that unanticipated capital gains are not important. In
an era of steady returns to investments (both interest and capital gains), that may
be a reasonable assumption, but in eras of more volatile asset prices, it is not
likely to be. In particular, in the UK, housing prices fell on average by 2.7 per
cent (nominal) between Wave 1 and Wave 2 of the RS. Correspondingly,
housing wealth fell by 22 per cent in real terms (Table 5 of Disney et al.). To
find the behavioural aspects associated with the change in housing wealth, we
should study transitions in home-ownership, and, conditional on a transition, the
value of housing bought or sold, and responses along other dimensions of choice.
Examples could be a delay in the age of retirement and a decline in consumption
to compensate for the fall in lifetime wealth. These would not be simple studies,
but the RS data have the raw ingredients for such studies.
As far as non-housing assets are concerned, we would expect individuals to
save during their 50s, and, because children will have established their own
households, the saving rate could be at its lifetime maximum. Even in their late
60s, individuals and couples may not have begun to dissave, but at least the rate
of saving should decline with age. This kind of pattern is suggested in Figure 5
of Disney et al. I would conclude that the overall patterns of asset change are not
inconsistent with the life-cycle model. What is required is to observe furtherFiscal Studies
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asset change as the population ages and mortality risk becomes more important,
and to observe asset change in a more normal macro-environment, especially
with respect to housing prices.
V. DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY
A correlation between economic status and health and mortality is evident in all
three papers. In Tanner’s paper, it appears in the reasons given for retirement
(Table 7): among those lacking an occupational pension, about 40 per cent gave
a health reason (either their own or another’s) for retirement compared with 25
per cent among those with an occupational pension. The implication is that those
in worse health have less income. In households where both spouses survived
between the waves, 64 per cent owned a house, compared with just 46 per cent
in widowed households (Table 1 of Disney et al.). In the surviving households,
75 per cent had some financial assets, compared with 65 per cent in widowed
households (Table 2 of Disney et al.). And surviving households had about 43
per cent more income from occupational pensions and investments than
widowed households (Table 6 of Johnson et al.).
The relationship between economic status and mortality has a number of
implications. To the extent that the mortality differences are known by
individuals, the life-cycle model will predict that rates of saving will differ by
economic status in a way that goes beyond any differences caused by economic
status itself.
7 As a cohort ages, average wealth may increase even if each
surviving household dissaves. Income and wealth inequality could decrease as
the less-well-to-do die. The overall implication is that to understand behaviour,
we need to have panel data where we can control for differential mortality in an
economic model.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the papers in this symposium have shown, we have learned a great deal from
the two waves of the Retirement Survey, and I am sure we will learn a great deal
more. Yet the ultimate value of the RS for scientific and policy research will not
be realised for many years. In the US, for example, a paper based on data from
the RHS was recently published in a leading economics journal even though the
final wave of the RHS was collected 19 years ago.
Even as the RS shows the value of a large panel data collection effort,
however, it illustrates the value of continued data collection. I believe that
serious consideration should be given to initiating a new RS. I say this based on
the US experience where, after considerable discussion, the decision has been
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made to attempt ongoing panel data collection from the middle- and old-aged
population. The HRS, as currently conceived and subject to budgetary
considerations and scientific review, will be an ongoing panel dataset that will
be ‘refreshed’ at the bottom of the age distribution by the addition of new
cohorts. For example, this year the cohorts of 1942–47 will be added to the
cohorts of 1931–41 and the HRS will represent the ages 51 to 67. It is planned to
continue to add younger cohorts in the future so as to keep the youngest age in
the HRS at about 51.
I can think of at least three major benefits of ongoing data collection. First,
from a purely data descriptive point of view, continued data collection will show
cohort or time effects in behaviour and will allow monitoring of these effects to
inform policy. Second, from a scientific point of view, we can learn a great deal
about behaviour if we have data over a period of important policy change or
unanticipated economic change. For example, in the US, the age at which full
social security benefits can be taken will increase from 65 to 65 plus two months
in 2003, and it will increase further by two months per year until it reaches 66.
An important rationale for bringing the cohorts of 1942–47 into the HRS was the
ability to observe changes in retirement behaviour in response to this policy
change. By being in the field in 2003, we can come close to a controlled
experiment. The third reason for considering a new panel is the issue of
international scientific competitiveness that I mentioned at the beginning of this
introduction. A number of other countries have ongoing panel data collections:
research in the UK will be at a disadvantage in the absence of a similar effort.
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